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Users often need to authenticate at situated displays in or-
der to, for example, make purchases, access sensitive in-
formation, or confirm an identity. However, the exposure
of interactions in public spaces introduces a large attack
surface (e.g., observation, smudge or thermal attacks).
A plethora of authentication models and input modalities
that aim at disguising users’ input has been presented in
the past. However, a comprehensive analysis on the re-
quirements for secure and usable authentication on public
displays is still missing. This work presents 13 design con-
siderations suitable to inform practitioners and researchers
during the development process of authentication systems
for situated displays in public spaces. It draws on a com-
prehensive analysis of prior literature and subsequent dis-
cussion with five experts in the fields of pervasive displays,
human-computer-interaction and usable security.
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CCS Concepts
•Human-centered computing→ Ubiquitous and mobile
computing theory, concepts and paradigms; •Security
and privacy→ Domain-specific security and privacy archi-
tectures;
Introduction & Background
There is an increasing need for users to authenticate on ter-
minals in public spaces. On the one hand, the portfolio of
digital consumer services in public spaces is being perma-
nently expanded. On the other hand, employees are more
and more replaced by situated self-service terminals [22].
Examples include, but are not limited to, systems like self-
service hotel receptions (see figure 1.A), interactive food
ordering systems (see figure 11.B), ticket machines (see
figure 1.C), and self-service checkouts in supermarkets
(see figure 1.D).
Figure 1: Users often need to
authenticate on public displays
e.g., self-service hotel receptions
(A), food ordering systems (B),
ticket machines (C), and
self-service checkouts (D)
However, prior research has highlighted challenges for de-
signing interactions with displays in public spaces [8]. The
public nature of the environment introduces the need for au-
thentication mechanisms that are resilient against intrusion,
and theft of user credentials [12, 15, 25]. For example, an
attacker could shoulder-surf a user during authentication to
observe the password [15], exploit smudge traces caused
by oily residue on the screen [5, 26] or use a thermal cam-
era to uncover heat traces [1, 24].
While a lot of work focused on identifying threats [1, 5, 12,
15] and proposed a myriad of authentication schemes dis-
guising users’ input on personal devices [3, 10, 17, 18, 29]
and situated displays [11, 13, 17], a comprehensive analy-
sis of the requirements for secure and usable authentication
on public displays is still missing as of today.
The contribution of this work is three-fold: We (i) conducted
an extensive literature review and discussed potential chal-
lenges with domain experts, (ii) identified a set of design
considerations targeting domain specific challenges that
can support researchers and professionals during the de-
sign and development of secure authentication schemes,
and (iii) briefly discuss and outlook on how to apply these
considerations for future work.
Requirement Analysis & Design Considerations
We carried out an analysis of related literature, aiming to
understand the challenges for secure and usable authen-
tication on situated displays (i.e., public internet terminals,
check-in counters, ticket vending machines, and cash ma-
chines) in public and semi-public spaces. From these, we
formulated design considerations to help professionals and
researchers in developing authentication schemes for situ-
ated displays.
Approach
This work draws on a comprehensive literature review across
various research domains. We reviewed a total of 118 peer-
reviewed scientific papers within the research field of per-
vasive displays, multimodal interaction techniques and us-
able security and subsequently discussed results with five
experts in the field of pervasive displays, human-computer-
interaction and usable security.
The existing literature revealed an importance of the fol-
lowing aspects: Exposure of hardware (physical access),
exposure of users’ input (i.e., visual accessibility), asso-
ciated threats (e.g, skimming), the target group, the user
behaviour, and the users’ expectations.
By clustering these aspects, we derived design considera-
tions along the following three dimensions: Security & Pri-
vacy, Usability and Accessibility.
Security & Privacy
As a result of the screen’s exposed location [8], interac-
tions on the display should be designed from ground up to
be secure. Abstracting the “secure by design pattern” in-
troduced by Dougherty et al. [14] for software engineering,
malicious behaviour (e.g., shoulder surfing or video attacks)
of vicious third-parties is taken for granted, thus the input
scheme should (1) disguise user input “by design” and
Figure 2: We propose a set of design considerations for secure & usable authentication on situated displays, evolving around the dimensions
usability, security & privacy and accessibility.
not rely on the user to protect their input. Schemes that em-
ploy cues that users respond to during the authentication [6,
18, 29], hence overwhelming attackers as they are required
to observe both, the cue on the screen as well as a user’s
response, appear to be very promising. Following recom-
mendations by Davies et al., the system should further (2)
respect the people’s need for privacy [9], thus not ex-
pose their privacy directly (e.g., by leaking information in
the public) or indirectly (e.g., through tracking for advertis-
ing purposes). When choosing an input modality, it should
be considered that an input technique not only needs to be
easy to use and secure but able to (3) convey a sense of
security .
Usability
The usage scenarios on public displays are characterised
by short interactions with frequently changing users [7, 23,
28] of a broad target group (self service baggage drop off,
payments on a kiosk terminal, withdrawing money from a
cash machine). Therefore, the authentication scheme and
input modalities should be (4) suitable for spontaneous
interaction and in particular not require users to perform a
calibration of sensor hardware [27] (e.g., motion sensors or
eye-trackers) prior to their authentication attempt.
Furthermore, users may also need guidance when ap-
proaching a display. On-boarding [30] (e.g., explaining
input gestures or modalities) and the guidance of users
to the correct interaction spot [2] are crucial for the users’
experience. Thus, appropriate means to (5) provide on-
boarding instructions (e.g., StrikeAPose presented by
Walter et al. [30]) and to (6) guide users to the interaction
sweet-spot (e.g., GravitySpot presented by Alt et al. [2])
should be considered.
Prior studies indicated that obscuring the input does not
only have an effect on the observer, but also on the legiti-
mate users that were trying to authenticate. Thus, an au-
thentication method should employ suitable (7) audio or
visual feedback . Previous work, which has shown that
users can easily get frustrated during interaction on public
displays, but are willing to correct errors if sufficient modali-
ties are provided. Thus, authentication schemes should (8)
allow users to correct their input [19].
Additionally, an ideal authentication system should (9) not
interrupt the users’ interaction flow [20, 21], but pro-
vide a seamless interaction experience (e.g., not require
to change the mean of interaction, or require the user to
switch devices).
Accessibility
Since public displays (e.g, cash machines) are subject to
be used from a diverse target group, the system should em-
ploy means for interaction (10) suitable for a large target
audience (e.g., different age groups) and (11) consider
accessibility (e.g. adjusting the height of screens or en-
able multiple input techniques) [4].
Likewise, the spatial situation around public displays is as
diverse as the user-base, thus input modalities should be-
https://www.overleaf.com/project/5bc8a0d2f97a440717c61597
(12) adapted to spatial conditions (e.g., areas limited in
interaction space may not be suitable for mid-air gestures).
Furthermore, authentication mechanisms on public dis-
plays (13) should not rely on users’ personal devices
or sensors, since users may not own or always carry their
mobile [16] or devices suffer from low battery or functional
defects.
Discussion
We do not claim that the design considerations presented
are comprehensive, nor do all need to be applied. Espe-
cially since in some cases their application may introduce
trade-offs between usability and security. Depending on the
employed technologies and the use-case, some aspects
might be less important, or do not apply. Thus, all aspects
need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. For exam-
ple, a terminal in a shopping mall where users can access
discounts or personalised navigation may employ a scheme
that focuses on usability (in particular allowing for easy and
spontaneous interaction (4)), but may be less secure since
it does not exploit highly sensible data (2)). A system that
relies on touch input may not need means to introduce the
modality or guide a user to an interaction spot (6). However,
we believe that our set of design considerations provides a
solid foundation for researchers as well as practitioners to
facilitate an informed decision-making process.
While the proposed design considerations mainly address
the development of future systems, the presented consider-
ations can further be used for critical evaluations of existing
concepts. For example, in traditional PIN based authenti-
cation schemes (e.g., on cash machines), a user’s input is
masked on the screen by replacing letters with asterisks.
However, the input modality does not disguise the actual
input (1), but relies on the user (e.g., to shield the PIN pad
with his hand).
Likewise, the considerations can motivate the adoption
of existing schemes (e.g., authentication schemes which
were developed in another context). The cue-based au-
thentication scheme SwiPIN, presented by von Zezschwitz
et al. [29], as an example, disguises input (1) by employ-
ing cues that users respond to during the authentication.
It proved to overwhelm attackers by requiring them to ob-
serve both, the cue shown on the screen as well as users’
response to the cue. While it was designed for the use on
mobile phones, its underlying design might be suitable to be
adopted for use on situated displays in public spaces.
Conclusion
This work presented 13 design considerations that aim to
guide practitioners and researchers when designing and
evaluating interaction models for authentication on situated
displays. The design guidelines derived from a literature re-
view and subsequent discussion with experts in the domain.
For future work, we aim to apply the design considerations
described in this work in an exemplary application to com-
pare input modalities for secure authentication on situated
displays.
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